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introduction : slavery and the historians of america ’s
“way of war”
For the two and a half centuries that followed the establishment of England’s first
North American colony at Jamestown, Virginia in 1607, the practice of slavery
and warfare on that continent were inextricably intertwined. The enslavement of
Native Americans taken captive in war was a recurrent objective of early military
campaigns in the colonies, fromNewEngland to the Carolinas. Slave raiding not
only provided labor, it served vital strategic functions. It allowed the militarily
weak English colonies to cement alliances with powerful Native American
confederacies by providing a ready market for their prisoners. Slave raiding
was also a form of proxy-war, by which the authority of rival imperial powers
was undermined by the enslavement of their native subjects. The relationship
between slavery and warfare was, however, a dynamic and contingent one.
Slave raiding declined as a characteristic of North American conflict by the
early eighteenth century. As racialized plantation societies developed in the
southern colonies, enslaved Africans and their descendants supplanted inden-
tured Europeans and Native Americans in the rice and tobacco fields. Yet war
and slavery remained intimately bound. The colonies’ own plantation societies
proved strategically vulnerable, as runaways and rebels forged alliances with
external enemies. Plantation slavery itself took on the characteristics of an
“internalwar.”The fundamental insecurities generated by an actually or potentially
rebellious enslaved population forged a militarized southern society and shaped
America’s earlymilitary institutions to a degree that has largely gone unrecognized.
America’s “way of war” cannot be understood without reference to slavery.
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Neither historians of America’s military experience nor historians of North
American slavery have recognized the depth or significance of this connection.
Thus, slavery has not figured in the long-running debate, initiated by Russell
Weigley in 1973, concerning the existence of a paradigmatic “American way of
war.”1 For Weigley, this was characterized by a dichotomy between an early,
essentially Fabian, strategy of “attrition” (as waged by George Washington
during the War of Independence), later supplanted by an inflexible, fire-power
heavy strategy of “annihilation” (allegedly exemplified by Ulysses Grant’s
campaigns during the CivilWar). This thesis proved both influential and enduring.
Yet, as Antulio Echevarria II has observed, its appeal was as much political as it
was academic, for it buttressed the case of policymakers urging fresh approaches to
the application of conventional force in the nuclear, and post-Vietnam, era.2
Military historians, however, eventually began to point to the limitations in the
simple duality inherent in Weigley’s analysis. In 2002, Brian McAllister Linn
offered a particularly telling critique. Weigley, he noted, had paid insufficient
attention both to those conventional campaigns where the United States had
avowedly pursued limited objectives, such as the Spanish-American War (1898)
or Korea (1950–1953), and to colonial campaigns of counterinsurgency and
pacification. He concluded that “if an ‘American way of war’ indeed exists, it is
far more complex than can be accommodated by Weigley’s central thesis.”3
Over the course of the last two decades, the debate over “the American way
of war” has been powerfully shaped by current affairs. The wars of the early
twenty-first century in Iraq and Afghanistan waged by the United States have
been strategically complex and interminable struggles against non-state actors,
in which “victory” has proved hard to define, yet alone achieve.4 Yet some
commentators (generally not historians) have argued that these conflicts have
heralded a “new American way of war”: “spurred by dramatic advances in
information technology, [seeking] a quick victory with minimal casualties on
both sides. Its hallmarks are speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. It is
heavily reliant upon precision firepower, special forces, and psychological
operations.”5 For historians, wary of both technological determinism in the study
1 Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and
Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).
2 Antulio Echevarria II, Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice from the
Revolution to Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 10.
3 Brian M. Linn and Russell F. Weigley, “‘The American Way of War’ Revisited,” Journal of
Military History 66 (2002): 501–33.
4 The literature is extensive, but for indicative examples, see Colin Grey, Irregular Enemies and the
Essence of Strategy: Can the AmericanWay ofWarAdapt? (Carlisle: United StatesArmyWarCollege,
2006); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (London: Penguin, 2006).
5 Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” Foreign Affairs 82 (2003): 41–58. For more
sceptical assessments, see Colin Grey, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the
Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass, 2002); Brice Harris, America, Technology and Strategic
Culture (London: Routledge, 2009).
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of war and the pitfalls of attempting to identify a distinctive and paradigmatic
pattern of “American” warfare, there has thus been a renewed incentive to re-
examine the conflicts of the past in all their complexities, to search for any
distinctive American style of warfare. Crucially, this has included consideration
of not only their narrow technical, strategic, or operational aspects but also the
wider political, social, and ethno-cultural contexts in which they took place, and
which shaped their course and conduct.
Some of the most striking, and long overdue, recent studies are of the
earliest “American way of war.” Two authors in particular, John Grenier and
Wayne Lee, have offered suggestive accounts that pointed to a colonial military
culture that left a profound legacy for subsequent wars. Both rooted the Amer-
ican experience in the precedents set by English “unlimited” warfare against the
“savage” and “barbarian” Irish in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These
campaigns were characterized by the destruction of the material resources upon
which hostile populations lived, the targeting of non-combatants, the expropri-
ation of land, and a willingness to treat “savages” outside of the prevailing moral
restraints common in early modern warfare. Soon engaged in incessant conflicts
against Native American peoples, English colonists (among them veterans of
the Irish wars) subsequently transplanted this “first American way of war” to the
New World.6 The conclusions of these studies are unsettling in the extreme; as
Grenier starkly affirms, “violence directed systematically against non-combatants
through irregularmeans, from the start, has been a central part ofAmerica’s way of
war.”7 Yet neither the particular circumstances of conflict with Native Americans
nor the legacy of English wars of conquest in Ireland can alone explain the
rapacious character of colonial warfare. Nor do they explain (or even acknowl-
edge) the evolution of a highly militarized plantation society in the southern
colonies, whose social and legal character was underpinned by sustained and
organized violence. To do this, and thus to fully understand the evolution of an
American way of war, we must consider the role of the institution of slavery.
This is not to suggest that historians, especially historians of slavery, have
failed to note the impact of war on plantation societies and their enslaved
workforce. Yet their attention has overwhelmingly been focused on three con-
flicts in this regard: the American War of Independence, the War of 1812, and
the American Civil War. The British, in two conflicts, offered freedom to the
enslaved as a deliberate strategy to undermine the foundations—economic,
political, and social—upon which their enemy’s war effort rested. During the
Civil War, the Union ultimately pursued the same strategy, to far greater and
more lasting effect, ending chattel slavery in the United States. In all three
6 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Wayne E. Lee, Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American
Warfare, 1500–1865 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
7 Grenier, First Way of War, 224.
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conflicts, the enslaved themselves took advantage of the disruption caused by
war either to self-emancipate or simply defy the authority of master or over-
seer locally.8 However, the narrow focus on these conflicts does not reveal the
full extent to which war and slavery were intertwined, right from the estab-
lishment of the earliest English settlements on continental North America,
through to the sectional conflict of the mid-nineteenth century. War was not an
aberrant or temporary phenomenon in the history of American slavery.
Enslavement of those captured in war and the defense of a peculiarly exploit-
ative form of racialized slavery as an institution were defining characteristics
of the rapacious and unrestrained “first American way of war.”
Servile insurrection, marronage, and the sustained, organized, and violent
responses to these by slaveholding regimes, were particularly important for-
mative elements.9 These should be understood as forms of “internal war”:
“any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution,
rulers, or policies.”10 Indeed, for historians of the Caribbean, such as Hilary
Beckles, conceptualizing slave resistance as “war” is a long-established prac-
tice.11 For historians of the North American continent, however, the fundamen-
tally “political” nature of violent resistance to slavery has often been minimized
or denied.12 Yet, as shall be emphasized here, internal resistance to slavery was
often catalyzed by an awareness of wider conflicts, with Native Americans or
rival European imperial powers, and thus the real possibility of forging alliances
or finding refuge from bondage. This surely constitutes a “political” motivation
for violent acts and serves as a reminder that the boundaries between external and
internal wars can be very blurred. Crucially, too, the response of the slaveholding
regime to the threat, perceived or actual, of insurrection must be considered.
Systematic violence was a central characteristic of labor management on the
plantation. Slave societies organized themselves to meet any potential challenge
8 For the Revolutionary War, see Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a
Revolutionary Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Jörge Nagler, “‘Achilles’ Heel’:
Slavery and War in the American Revolution,” in Roger Chickering, ed., War in an Age of Revo-
lution, 1775–1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 285–98; and Laura Sandy,
“Divided Loyalties in a ‘Predatory War’: Plantation Overseers during the American Revolution,”
Journal of American Studies 48 (2014): 357–92. For 1812, see Alan Taylor, The Internal Enemy:
Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772—1832 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013); and Gene Allen Smith,
The Slaves’Gamble: Choosing Sides in theWar of 1812 (NewYork: PalgraveMacmillan, 2013). For
the Civil War, see James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States,
1861–1865 (New York: Norton, 2013).
9 Marronage refers to the establishment of autonomous communities in isolated locations, raiding
plantations and resisting attempts at re-enslavement; from the Spanish cimarron, “wild.”
10 Harry Eckstein, “On the Etiology of InternalWars,”History and Theory 4 (1965): 133–63, 133;
Gerald Mullin, Flight and Rebellion: Slave Resistance in Eighteenth-Century Virginia (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1972), 155–60.
11 Hilary Beckles, “The 200YearsWar: Slave Resistance in the BritishWest Indies. AnOverview
of the Historiography,” Jamaican Historical Review 13 (1982): 1–12.
12 See, for example, George M. Frederickson and Christopher Lasch, “Resistance to Slavery,”
Civil War History 13 (1967): 315–29.
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with organized violence. From the overseer’s lash and the packs of bloodhounds,
through to the mandatory slave patrols and the militia, slave societies were
societies organized for war against the enslaved. Focusing on the weaponizing
of bloodhounds as instruments of torture and execution, Sara Johnson has posed
the question, “Can one ever speak of a peaceful cohabitation of the enslaved
and free in the context of slavery such that the use of dogs in the quotidian context
is much different from their use during a declared state of full rebellion?” She
notes that “Violence was the modus operandi for sustaining elite slave holding
lifestyles.” Her conclusion is highly significant: “Plantation America poses
a challenge to conventional understandings of ‘warfare’ and ‘torture’ as terms
for supposedly discrete, bounded activities (a military encounter between mul-
tiple states, a particularmoment of cruelty) with utilitarian purposes (the achieve-
ment of military goals, the extraction of information).”13 American historians
should now extend their analysis beyond conventional bounded definitions, to
consider the violent, rapacious, “quotidian context” of plantation slavery as an
integral element in the story of “the American way of war.”
early origins : warfare and the enslavement of native
americans in new england
It is particularly important to acknowledge the extent to which colonial warfare
was driven by the desire to enslave Native Americans. While the system of
racialized slavery that was established in British North American was eventually
dependent upon enslaved Africans and their descendants, tens of thousands of
Native Americans captured in the conflicts of the seventeenth and early eigh-
teenth centuries had previously been reduced to bondage. This enslavement
was not simply a byproduct of conflict—it was an objective. For example, in
the earliest phases of their establishment, the New England colonies had a
pressing need for bonded labor beyond that which could be provided by
European indentured servants. However, under English law, capture in “just
war” was the only means by which Native Americans could legitimately be
reduced to such status. Indeed, the opportunity to enslave Native American
women for domestic servitude was central to the mobilization and payment of
New England’s soldiers. During the Pequot War, 1636–1637, it was recorded
that “Conetecut men have had their equall share in women and treys [plundered
household goods].”14
The significance of slavery to the Pequot War has often been overlooked.
The conflict has chiefly drawn the attention of historians because of the
13 Sara E. Johnson, “‘You Should Give Them Blacks to Eat’: Waging Inter-American Wars of
Torture and Terror,” American Quarterly 61, 1 (2009): 65–92, 81–82.
14 Margaret Ellen Newell, “Indian Slavery in New England,” in Alan Gallay, ed., Indian Slavery
in Colonial America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 38–40.
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extraordinary level of lethal violence evident at the massacre of several hundred
inhabitants of a Pequot village, on 26May 1637, without regard to age or gender,
at West Mystic, Connecticut. This act was perpetrated by soldiers of the
Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut colonies. Their Native American allies,
Narragansetts and Mohegans, were reportedly horrified by the bloodletting:
“Our Indians came to us, andmuch rejoyced at our victories, and greatly admired
the manner of English mens fight,”Captain John Underhill recorded, “but [they]
cried mach it, mach it; that is, it is naught, it is naught, because it is too furious,
and slaies too many men.”15 Historians such as Adam J. Hirsch and Ronald Dale
Karr have, thus, debated the extent to which the Pequot conflict was indicative of
a broader “clash of military cultures,” contrasting the high lethality of European
warfare with the (putative) low lethality of Native American warfare. In a similar
vein, Geoffrey Parker has pointed to the same massacre as evidence that early
modern European colonists fought primarily to kill, not to enslave, and that this
characteristic was part of an early modern “military revolution” that laid the
foundations for Western global hegemony.16
The problem with this line of argument is that the outright, physical extir-
pation of the village on the Mystic River was not typical of patterns of lethal
violence during the war as a whole. Massacres of prisoners were commonplace,
but they were usually gendered: men of military age were killed (unless they had
some especial value, as translators or guides). Women and children were gener-
ally enslaved. Both Lee and Grenier only briefly mention the enslavement of
Pequot captives by the Narragansetts and Mohegans, which they note was in
accordance with established indigenous practice.17 In fact, a high proportion of
the women and children captured during the war also entered Puritan households
as slaves. Contemporary English accounts note the brutal torture and execution
of male captives (a practice shared with indigenous warfare): “[The prisoner]
braved the English as though they durst not kill a Pequot.… But it availed this
salvage [sic] nothing, they tied one of his legs to a post and 20 men with a rope
tied to the other, pulled him in pieces, Captain Underhill shooting a pistoll through
him to dispatch him.” And they note how the women and children were con-
demned to involuntary servitude (also a shared characteristic with Native Amer-
icanwarfare): “captain Patrick… brought eightie captives to the bay of Boston.”18
15 JohnUnderhill,News fromAmerica; Or, ANew and Experementall Discoverie of NewEngland
(London: 1638), 42–43.
16 Adam J. Hirsch, “The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England,”
Journal of American History 74 (1988): 1187–212; Ronald Dale Karr, “‘Why Should You Be So
Furious?’: The Violence of the Pequot War,” Journal of American History 85 (1998): 876–909;
Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 118.
17 Grenier, First Way of War, 28–29; Lee, Barbarians and Brothers, 154–56.
18 Philip Vincent, ATrue Relation of the Late Battell fought in New England between the English
and the Pequet Salvages (London: 1638), 6, 9.
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It is difficult to establish exactly how many Pequot captives were enslaved
as a consequence of the war. Most were quickly distributed to individual house-
holds, with no definitive count of their total. Michael Fickes has, on the basis of
Governor John Winthrop’s testimony, suggested that about three hundred cap-
tives were taken by the English. This may not seem a significant number but, as
Fickes points out, considering the low overall population of the colonies at the
time, “if only 280 Pequot captives remained within Massachusetts Bay, Con-
necticut, and Plymouth, they would have boosted the colonies’ combined total
population by an estimated 3% and the servant population by approximately
18%.” War-captured Native Americans were thus of some importance to the
demography of the early New England colonies. Fickes’ focus on the servile
population is particularly telling since it emphasizes the motive for the enslave-
ment of Native American women and children: the acute shortage of domestic
(mostly female) servants during the early phases of colonization. Beyond that
immediate demand for domestic labor, enslavement of women and, particularly,
children served a wider assimilationist agenda: it was expected that the captives
would, in the school of servitude, both Anglicize and Christianize.19
Yet the historical significance of the Pequot War goes beyond the mere
number of captives consigned to Puritan households. The war was indeed, as
Grenier terms it, “a war of extirpation.” Yet that extirpation was achieved as
much through enslavement as through massacre. Nor was this an isolated exam-
ple. New Englanders would continue to enslave Native Americans in significant
numbers in later conflicts. Even after 1644, by which time Boston merchants
were importing enslaved Africans into New England (and they and their descen-
dants would eventually displace Native Americans as domestic servants), Native
Americans captured in war continued to be reduced to servitude, either within
New England, or, increasingly, sold outside the colony to help offset the costs of
war. The precise nature of that servitude did differ from colony to colony. For
example, in the aftermath of Metacom’s (King Philip’s) War (1675–1676), some
one thousand Native Americans were enslaved by New Englanders, from a
regional prewar population of about twelve thousand, three thousand of whom
died during the course of the conflict.20 The Connecticut General Court ordered
that of former enemies who had surrendered, “That such of them as cannot be
proved murtherers shall have theire lives and shall not be sould out of the
Country for slaves. They shall be well used in service with the English where
the Councill shall dispose of them.” After ten years of “good service” they were
to have their “liberty to become sojourners or to dwell on our respective townes
for themselves.…” In short, their condition was to be similar to that of European
19 Michael L. Fickes, “‘They Could Not Endure that Yoke’: The Captivity of Pequot Women and
Children after the War of 1637,” New England Quarterly 73 (2000): 57–81, 61–64.
20 Matthew S.Muelbauer and David J. Ulbrich,Ways of War: AmericanMilitary History from the
Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2018), 35–36.
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indentured servants. Massachusetts and Plymouth, on the other hand, “freely
sold their Indian captives into perpetual slavery, both inside and outside their
borders.”21 To the South, in the Chesapeake, the situation was the same. Con-
temporary Virginian legislation declared “all Indians taken in warr be held and
accounted slaves dureing life.”22
There was, by this point, some concern within New England communities
about the potentially dangerous presence of enslaved Native Americans, drawn
from hostile local populations, in their households. Metacom’s War had been an
existential crisis for the New England colonies, during which 10 percent of the
male population became casualties. It catalyzed a change in attitudes towards
their indigenous neighbors among Puritans, who were abandoning their pious
hopes that “savages” might be transformed into Godly Englishmen. Now the
colonists tended to articulate prejudices concerning the immutable and beastly
nature of Native Americans, “Monsters shapt and fac’d like men,” that indicated
the emergence and hardening of a recognizably racist ideology.23 Some colonists
petitioned to have the captives removed altogether. Others, especially those who
had taken captive children and youths into their homes as servants and appren-
tices, argued that their labor was required, to make good that of lost fathers, sons,
and brothers.24 However, just as the practice of enslaving (local) captives of war
was beginning to be questioned in New England, it would become a central
dynamic in the wars fought by the recently established colonies of the Carolinas.
warfare , slave raiding , and imperial rivalry in the
southeast
According to Alan Gallay’s estimates, from 1670, the year South Carolina was
established as a colony, to 1715, somewhere between thirty and fifty thousand
Native Americans were either captured directly by Carolinian colonists, or, more
frequently, were traded to them by their native allies, and enslaved.25 As Gallay
explains, this was not simply an incidental corollary of the colonization of South
Carolina; the settlers “[actively pursued] slaving expeditions as a tool for impe-
rial growth.” As a military strategy, slave raiding weakened the position of
imperial rivals, Spain in Florida and the French in Louisiana, by targeting the
native people who had allied themselves to those powers. This, in itself, is a
21 Quoted in James Drake, “Restraining Atrocity: The Conduct of King Philip’s War,” New
England Quarterly 70 (1997): 33–56, 43. John A. Sainsbury, “Indian Labor in Early Rhode
Island,” New England Quarterly 48 (1975): 378–93, 382.
22 Quote in Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North
America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 110.
23 Alden T.Vaughan,Roots of American Racism (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1995), 24–25.
24 Jenny Hale Pulsipher, “‘Our Sages are Sageles’: A Letter onMassachusetts Indian Policy after
King Philip’s War,” William and Mary Quarterly 58 (2001): 431–48 433–34.
25 Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South,
1670–1717 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 299.
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notable characteristic of this early “way of war”; it was an example of a strategic
“indirect approach.”Carolinians “learned that they could make greater profits by
attacking and enslaving a European foe’s allies than by assaulting the Europeans
directly.” Much of the actual fighting was also done by proxies. The physical
involvement of the colonists themselves in slave raiding expeditions in the South
was limited.26
This is another reminder of the particular circumstances governing the
“first way of war”: like all the English colonies established on continental
North America, South Carolina was perilously weak, in military terms, for
decades after its establishment. The colony’s survival depended upon forging
alliances with regionally powerful Native American peoples, supplying them
with valuable manufactured goods and arms, and enmeshing them in the emerg-
ing trans-Atlantic commercial economy. The Richahecrians, later known to the
Carolinians as the Westos, were first armed with muskets by Virginian colonists
in the 1650s. The colonists also provided them with a ready market for beaver
pelts and for slaves, whowould be set towork in their tobacco fields. Theywould
subsequently enter into similar trading relations with the Carolinians, aggres-
sively targeting the peoples under Spanish paramountcy in Florida.27 Indeed, the
unremitting pressure of the slave raids devastated the Spanish colony. John
Worth commented that “from a far-flung mission system encompassing more
than twenty-five thousand Indians in the mid-seventeenth century, Spanish
Florida by 1706 was reduced to a handful of refugee missions with just over
four hundred Indians huddled around the terrorized residents of St. Augustine.”
The ramifications of this way of war go far beyond simple extirpation or
dispossession. Ultimately, the slave raiding “way of war” pursued by the English
colonists and their native allies had effected the complete transformation of
the established demographic, political, and social structures of the southeast
and eroded a Spanish hegemony that had been established long before the
English arrived.28
Slave raiding also critically shaped the internal development of South
Carolina itself, promoting rapid economic growth but in the context of demo-
graphic instability and systemic violence. It ultimately provoked a war that
threatened to destroy the colony. Many of the first English migrants to settle
in South Carolina came not direct from England but from the Caribbean colony
26 Ibid., 164, 187, 197.
27 Eric E. Bowne, “‘Carrying awaye their Corne and Children,’ The Effects ofWesto Slave Raids
on the Indians of the Lower South,” in Robbie Ethridge and Sheri M. Shuck-Hall, eds.,Mapping the
Mississippian Shatter Zone: The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the
American South (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 105.
28 John E. Worth, “Razing Florida: The Indian Slave Trade and the Devastation of Spanish
Florida, 1659–1715,” in Robbie Ethridge and Sheri M. Shuck-Hall, eds.,Mapping the Mississippian
Shatter Zone: The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American South
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 295–311.
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of Barbados, founding Charles Town (now Charleston) in 1670. Their experi-
ences in a Caribbean colony, where slavery was well established, ultimately
drove South Carolina’s economic and social development in the direction of a
plantation society, in which rice production would prove the most profitable
crop.29 About a quarter of the captives of slave raiding were put to work on
Carolinian plantations but, in the long term, the preferred labor force for culti-
vating rice was African. The trade in enslaved Native Americans allowed Car-
olinians quickly to raise the capital necessary to establish plantations and
purchase the bondspeople they required for rice production. Thus, Alan Gallay
has now suggested that, up until 1715, Charles Town actually exported more
slaves than it imported. Many, perhaps most, were exported northward. Carolina
slaves were cheaper than Africans and were thought more tractable and less
likely to escape than locally enslaved Wampanoags or Narragansetts. A retro-
spective account, A Description of South Carolina, published in 1761, recorded
the colony’s early exports to “New England, New York and Pensilvania” as
“tanned hides, small Deer Skins, Gloves, Rice” and “Slaves taken by the Indians
inWar.”30 Yet the volatile nexus of war, enslavement, and commerce provoked a
decisive conflict between the Carolinians and the Yamasee confederacy, until
recently the most powerful military arm of South Carolina’s own slave-raiding
expeditions.
The confederacy drew its military strength from warriors who represented
almost all the nations of the southeast, among them not just Yamasee but others
such as Apalachee, Catawba, Waxhaw, and Creek. These had fought as allies of
the Carolinians against the French and their native allies during Queen Anne’s
War (1702–1713), and against the Tuscarora, during a protracted recent conflict
in North Carolina (1711–1713). Their precise motives for turning against the
colonists are much debated. The high-handed and abusive behavior of English
traders has often been seen as a principal cause of the conflict. More recently,
accounts have stressed other factors, such as colonists’ encroachment onYamasee
territory. Significant, too, was a breakdown in diplomatic relations. Traditional
mechanisms by which allegiances had been maintained (gift-giving, hospital-
ity, speech-making) were undermined by the discipline of the market economy
and pressure from traders for the Yamasee to pay their mounting debts. Most
accounts, however, emphasize the destabilizing influence of slavery in trig-
gering the conflict. Although the Tuscarora War had recently provided the
Yamasee with a bountiful source of captives, the internal Carolinian slave trade
had been in a longer-term decline, undercutting both their economic position
and the diplomatic leverage they had exercised over the colonists. Yamasee
29 PeterWood, BlackMajority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono
Rebellion (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1975), 4–6, 9, 35.
30 “ADescription of South Carolina” (London: 1761), in B. R. Carroll, ed.,Historical Collections
of South Carolina, vol. 2 (New York: Harper Brothers, 1836), 255.
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population was falling too, heightening their growing sense of vulnerability.
Their slave raiding expeditions and the subsequent commerce in captives had,
Paul Kelton notes, “served as a primary mechanism for the spread of infectious
germs throughout the South.”Between 1699 and 1712, a series of epidemics—
influenza, typhus, measles, smallpox—had trailed in the wake of conflict in
the southeast and had taken a dramatic toll of slavers and enslaved alike.31
Weakened, indebted, and all-too-mindful of the growing strength and wealth of
the colonists, the Yamasee themselves began to suspect that they too would
be enslaved. In April 1715 they and their allies struck at outlying plantations
and trading posts.32
The colony reeled. Refugees abandoned the countryside and fled into
Charles Town. For months, the future of the province hung in the balance. From
a total population of only about sixteen thousand (including the enslaved, a slight
majority since 1708), upwards of four hundred had been killed by spring 1717,
when the fighting began to abate. The colony’s militia, which at this point
comprised both free and enslaved soldiers, had been hard-pressed, but vital
reinforcements and military supplies had arrived from Virginia and New
England in 1715. Crucially, fighting between Native Americans, such as the
Cherokee and Creek, weakened the Carolinians’ enemies.33 The aftermath of
the conflict saw highly significant developments in the southern colonies that,
once again, illustrated the deep but evolving relationship between war and
slavery in America.
The conflict did not mark a definitive end to slave raiding against Native
Americans as a characteristic of American warfare. The practice would revive
over a century later during the United States’ colonization of the Southwest.
For example, some twenty thousand Native Americans, many of them children
seized in violent raids on their settlements, were held in some form of invol-
untary servitude in California following the war with Mexico (1846–1848).34
31 Paul Kelton, “‘Shattered and Infected’: Epidemics and the Origins of the Yamasee War, 1696–
1715,” in Robbie Ethridge and Sheri M. Shuck-Hall, eds.,Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone:
The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American South (Lincoln: Univer-
sity of Nebraska Press, 2009), 312–32.
32 Richard L. Haan, “‘The Trade Do’s Not Flourish as Formerly’: The Ecological Origins of the
Yamasee War of 1715,” Ethnohistory 28 (1981): 341–58; and William L. Ramsey, “‘Something
Cloudy in Their Looks’: The Origins of the Yamasee War Reconsidered,” Journal of American
History 90 (2003): 44–75. See also Claudio Saunt, “‘The English HasNow aMind toMake Slaves of
Them All’: Creeks, Seminoles, and the Problem of Slavery,” American Indian Quarterly 22 (1998):
157–80.
33 See Larry Ivers, This Torrent of Indians: War on the Southern Frontier, 1715–1728 (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 2016); and William L. Ramsey, The Yamasee War: A Study of
Culture, Economy, andConflict in the Colonial South (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008).
34 See Benjamin Madley, “‘Unholy Traffic in Human Blood and Souls’: Systems of California
Indian Servitude under U.S. Rule,” Pacific Historical Review 83 (2014): 626–67, 655; and
Michael F. Magliari, “Free State Slavery: Bound Indian Labor and Slave Trafficking in California’s
Sacramento Valley, 1850–1864,” Pacific Historical Review 81 (2012): 155–92.
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Yet, notwithstanding this later revival, the Yamasee War did mark the conclu-
sion of enslavement of Native American captives as a primary characteristic of
colonial warfare. And this fact had decisive consequences for the development
of plantation economies and the use of organized violence that maintained
them as slave societies.
“robberys , murders , and piracys” : maroons and their allies
The ending of the colonial trade in captive Native Americans catalyzed the
transition to reliance upon enslaved Africans and African Americans as the labor
force of plantation enterprises, eventually supplanting both European indentured
servants and captive Native Americans. The latter, whilst undoubtedly the object
of hardening racial prejudices, were not consigned to the same legally mandated,
permanently degraded, inherently servile status that Euro-Americans associated
with those of sub-Saharan African descent.35 This transition had been underway
since at least the 1660s in Virginia, but was hastened by on-going military
pressures such as the Yamasee conflict. The legal framework for racial slavery
took shape; the hitherto somewhat blurry distinction between “servant” and
“slave” was drawn ever more firmly. The latter category was defined by its
association with skin color, its permanence, its inheritance through the mother’s
status, and its commodification of people as “chattel,” a form of movable
property. Notwithstanding the crucial service of enslaved soldiers in early colo-
nial wars, they were soon denied the right to bear arms and disbarred from
military service. Fear of insurrection cast bondspeople as the enemy within, as a
military threat rather than a military resource. Exclusion from militia service on
racial grounds became, in Benjamin Quarles’words, a policy “so prevalent as to
constitute a basic tenet of American military tradition.”36
The relationship between this process andwar is particularly well illustrated
in the case of South Carolina and the evolving role of overseers as both managers
of plantation enterprises and defenders of slavery in times of conflict. In 1712,
the South Carolina assembly passed a “deficiency law” that penalized planters
upon whose properties “…six negroes or slaves shall be employed without one
or more white person living and residing on the same plantation.” Such laws
were a response to a number of concerns including rumors of servile conspiracy
35 See Gregory Ablavsky, “Making Indians ‘White’: The Judicial Abolition of Native Slavery in
Revolutionary Virginia and Its Racial Legacy,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 159 (2011):
1457–531; and Owen Stanwood, “Captives and Slaves: Indian Labor, Cultural Conversion, and the
Plantation Revolution in Virginia,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 114 (2006): 434–63.
36 Benjamin Quarles, “The Colonial Militia and NegroManpower,”Mississippi Valley Historical
Review 45 (1959): 643–52, 643. For the legal context, see Eugene Sirmans, “The Legal Status of
Slaves in South Carolina, 1670–1740,” Journal of Southern History 28 (1962): 462–73; andWilliam
Wiecek, “The Statutory Law of Slavery and Race in the Thirteen Mainland Colonies of British
America,” William & Mary Quarterly 34 (1977): 258–80.
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and a sense that many white colonists (principally those who had not arrived via
the established slave society of Barbados) failed to understand the true character
of chattel slavery (some were allowing their bondspeople to labor unsupervised,
travel freely, and trade and earn wages in their own right). Yet the timing of the
legislation also indicates the extent to which war was a factor. The trigger for the
1712 legislation was South Carolina’s decision to join their neighbors in North
Carolina in their conflict against the Tuscarora. Five years later, further legisla-
tion restricted the behavior of the enslaved and tightened up the requirements for
their supervision in the (protracted and violent) aftermath of the YamaseeWar.37
This in itself was a reflection of the extent to which servile insurrection and
war against external foes were inextricably bound. While the Carolinians nego-
tiated peace terms with the majority of their enemies in 1717, the surviving
Yamasees themselves remained defiant. They physically relocated away from
the orbit of English colonists into that of Spain and launched attacks against
isolated plantations. They did not do so alone. Many enslaved Africans had
either escaped during the war or been captured byNative American forces. Some
of these now joined the Yamasee in their guerrilla war against South Carolina.
In 1728, over a decade after the Yamasee war was officially concluded, it was
reported that an on-going campaign of “Robberys, Murders and Piracys” was
being waged against South Carolinian plantations by Yamasees, Creeks, and
runaway slaves based in Spanish Florida.38 This phenomenon was not restricted
to the conflicts ebbing and flowing around English colonies, it was characteristic
of warfare in the Southeast as a whole. Africans, for example, were numbered
among the defenders of Natchez fortifications in January 1730, resisting a Franco-
Choctaw army.39 In these circumstances, attempting to distinguish between war
with an external enemy and servile insurrection becomes a largely meaningless
exercise. Both were shaping America’s “way of war.”
In the Southeast, this pattern of warfare, with the slave-holding regime
engaged in an on-going conflict with maroons and their Native American allies,
would persist with varying degrees of intensity for well over a century and was
absolutely formative to the creation of “the Old South,” amilitarized andmilitant
slave society.While Florida remained part of the Spanish Empire, the authorities
there were well aware of the strategic possibilities that destabilizing slavery in
37 Statutes at Large of South Carolina (Columbia: A. S. Johnson, 1836–1841), Thomas Cooper
and David McCord, eds., 10 vols., 2: 363, 3: 193, 272, 4: 97, 175.
38 Verner W. Crane, The Southern Frontier 1670–1732 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
Press, 2004), 247; L. H. Roper, “The 1701 ‘Act for the Better Ordering of Slaves’: Reconsidering
the History of Slavery in Proprietary South Carolina,”William and Mary Quarterly 64 (2007): 395–
418, 400.
39 George Edward Milne, “Picking up the Pieces: Natchez Coalescence in the Shatter Zone,” in
Robbie Ethridge and Sheri M. Shuck-Hall, eds., Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone: The
Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American South (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 2009), 408.
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the neighboring English colonies presented. In 1738, runaways were granted
their own settlement, Gracia Rel de Santa Teresa de Mose. Some enlisted in
Spanish military units and played a key role in defending St. Augustine from a
British invasion in 1740. Even more alarmingly for planters dependent upon
cowed and captive African labor, the Spanish forces that invaded Georgia in
1742 included an entire “regiment of Negros,”with their own officers.40 The lure
of freedom in nearby territory encouraged flight from the plantations of the
Carolinas and Georgia, and fostered armed conflict. John Thornton has argued
that the Stono Rebellion of 1739, the most serious insurrection that South
Carolina faced, was led by recently enslaved African prisoners of war, experi-
enced soldiers who aimed to fight their way to Spanish Florida.41
While rebels and maroons may have been denounced as murderers, pirates,
and brigands by slaveholders, there is telling evidence that some of them, at least,
understood their own activities very much as a form of warfare. An encampment
of some forty maroons sheltering in a swamp north of the Savannah River in
1765 was organized “on military lines.” Each morning, the insurgents raised
their colors, to the beat of a drum.42 After the withdrawal of the British from
Georgia after the War of Independence, Loyalist maroons continued to refer
to themselves as “soldiers of the King of England.” They offered a “general
asylum” to runaways in the region and waged a partisan warfare against plan-
tations along the Savannah River until 1787. Their suppression in that year by
a considerable force of Georgian and South Carolinian militia, supported by
Native American auxiliaries, was a stark illustration of the significance of
military activity aimed at re-establishing racial slavery in the post-revolutionary
era.43 Similarly, in the spring and summer of 1795, North Carolinians launched
40 Jane Landers, “Spanish Sanctuary: Fugitives in Florida, 1687–1790,” Florida Historical
Quarterly 62 (1984): 296–313, 301; Kevin Mulroy, Freedom on the Border: The Seminole Maroons
in Florida, the Indian Territory, Coahuila and Texas, (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1993),
9–10.
41 John K. Thornton, “African Dimensions of the Stono Rebellion,” American Historical Review
96 (1991): 1101–13. Thornton’s analysis reflects a significant historiographical trend, with a number
of scholars emphasising the transmission of African military expertise into enslaved communities
across the Atlantic world. See, for examples, Manuel Barcia, “‘Weapons from Their Land’: Arming
Strategies and Practices among West African-Born Soldiers in early Nineteenth-Century Bahia and
Cuba,” Slavery & Abolition 39 (2018): 479–96; and Vincent Brown, Tacky’s Revolt: The Story of an
Atlantic Slave War (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2020).
42 Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 170.
43 Timothy Lockley, “‘The King of England’s Soldiers’: Armed Blacks in Savannah and Its
Hinterlands during the Revolutionary War Era, 1778–1787,” in Leslie Harris and Daina Berry,
eds., Slavery and Freedom in Savannah (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2014), 26–41. The
military service of former slaves in the British army during the war had crucial subsequent impli-
cations for the British Empire, too, as many such soldiers continued to serve in the West Indies. See
Maria Alessandra Bollettino, “‘Of equal or of more service’: Black Soldiers and the British Empire in
the Mid-Eighteenth-Century Caribbean,” Slavery & Abolition 38 (2017): 510–33; and Gary Sellick,
“Black Skin, Red Coats: the Carolina Corps and Nationalism in the Revolutionary British
Caribbean,” Slavery & Abolition 39 (2018): 459–78.
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successive military strikes against well-organized maroons led by “the General
of the Swamps.”44 An understanding of these activities as essentially martial in
nature appears to have been long maintained within African American families.
Among the oral testimonies collected by the FederalWriters Project in the 1930s
was that of George Cato, a laborer from Columbia, South Carolina. He believed
himself to be the direct descendent of Cato, who had led the rebels at Stono.
Reflecting what he had learned of family history from his own grandfather,
he did not speak of flight or rebellion. His language casts the event entirely
in military terms; his ancestor was “cap[tain] Cato” and he led “a slave army”
in a “war.”45
Marronagewas themost viable tactic in this war and it was a running sore to
Carolinian and Georgian slavery. Spain ceded Florida to Britain in the 1763
Treaty of Paris and evacuated many of the inhabitants to Cuba. Yet Florida,
sparsely settled, politically unstable, and with remote and inaccessible areas
offering sanctuary to those fleeing servitude, continued to act as a magnet for
the resistant and the rebellious. Those who escaped slavery and established
autonomous communities in Florida forged close bonds with the Seminoles,
a Native American people who had also recently migrated into the region.
Although the maroons lived in their own, self-governing villages, they paid
tribute to Seminole chiefs, took a lead in joint military ventures and acted as
intermediaries with whites in trade and diplomacy. Many historians, such as
Kenneth Porter, simply refer to them as “Black Seminoles.”46 During the Rev-
olutionary War, they would ally with the British and continue their cross-border
attacks on plantations, in conjunction with other local Loyalist forces.47
The return of Florida to Spanish rule in 1783 exacerbated the maroon threat
to the plantations of South Carolina and Georgia. The growing black population
in Florida (including hundreds armed and trained by the Spanish in their garrison
forces) fueled acute racial anxieties, especially in the aftermath of the Haitian
Revolution (1791–1804), for it was feared that “the exiles of Florida”might form
the revolutionary vanguard of a wider servile insurrection. The United States
engaged in frantic diplomacy to secure the return of runaways from both the
Spanish authorities and various Native American peoples, but with little success.
44 Herbert Aptheker, “Maroons within the Present Limits of the United States,” Journal of Negro
History 24 (1939): 167–84, 170–71.
45 “‘As it come down to me’: Black Memories of Stono in the 1930s,” in Mark M. Smith, ed.,
Documenting and Interpreting a Southern Slave Revolt (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 2005), 55–56.
46 Kenneth W. Porter, The Black Seminoles: History of a Freedom-Seeking People (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 1996); Y. N. Kly, “The African American Insurgency 1739–1858,” in
Y. N. Kly, ed., The Invisible War: The African American Anti-Slavery Resistance (Atlanta: Clarity
Press, 2006), 46–87.
47 Jim Piecuch, Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians and Slaves in the Revolutionary
South, 1775–1782 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2008), 148.
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Georgians and Carolinians were thus soon looking for a military solution to
protect the institution of slavery.48
In 1812, American “Patriots,” supported by an invasion from Georgia and
U.S. naval forces, and with the (initial) backing of President James Madison,
launched an abortive revolution against the Spanish crown to secure East Florida
(West Florida, administered as a separate colony, having already been annexed
by the United States in 1810).49 Although in many respects this filibustering
expeditionwas a simple land-grab, exploiting Spanishweakness and preempting
any attempt by the British to re-establish themselves in the region, its connection
to slavery was strong. The Patriots hoped to end the threat posed by the maroons
and their Native American allies. The ensuing conflict effectively demonstrated
that the difficulties of drawing clear distinctions between war, marronage, and
servile insurrection apply to the early republic as much as to the colonial period.
The Patriots seized the town of Fernandina on Amelia Island in March, and a
force of two hundred men then moved to take St. Augustine. There, however,
they were stalled before the fortifications of Castillo de San Marcos. As the
United States then found itself embroiled in an altogether bigger war with Great
Britain,Madison began to entertain serious doubts about the dubious legality and
adventurism of events in Florida. It was concern for slavery that prolonged the
unfolding debacle. Governor D. B. Mitchell of Georgia informed the wavering
President “nearly two companies of black troops” had arrived from Havana and
“[if these soldiers] are suffered to remain in the province, our southern country
[will] soon be in a state of insurrection.”50
Subsequent events heightened these fears. In June, a new Spanish provin-
cial governor, Don Sebastian Kindelan, arrived. While astutely maintaining a
diplomatic fiction that Spain and the United States were not at war, he forged an
alliance with the maroons and Seminoles. These attacked Patriot-owned plan-
tations, foraging parties, and outposts. By the autumn, the invader’s position was
untenable. On 12 September, U.S. Marines and Georgia militia escorting a
supply convoy suffered heavy casualties in a well-executed ambush in the
TwelveMile Swamp, northwest of St. Augustine. This defeat “signaled the swift
collapse of the entire East Florida invasion.”51
Yet the continued desire to acquire Spanish Florida and secure slavery’s
vulnerable southern frontier would impel southerners into further military
adventures, and they would drag the rest of the Union, however reluctantly, with
them.Although often subsumedwithin larger, overlapping conflicts, the role that
48 James G. Cusick, The Other War of 1812: The “Patriot War” and the American Invasion of
East Florida (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003), 48.
49 For further background, see J.C.A. Stagg, “James Madison and George Mathews: The East
Florida Revolution of 1812 Reconsidered,” Diplomatic History 30 (2006): 23–55.
50 Quoted in J. H. Alexander, “The Ambush of Captain John Williams, U.S.M.C.: Failure of the
East Florida Invasion, 1812–1813,” Florida Historical Quarterly 56 (1978): 280–96, 286.
51 Ibid., 81.
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suppressing maroons, re-enslaving runaways, and driving a wedge between
Native Americans and African Americans played in the early republic’s “way
of war” should not be underestimated. A punitive expedition of Georgia militia,
itching to avenge the failure of the recent invasion, drove oncemore into Spanish
territory in late September 1812, with the objective of destroying the Seminoles.
Having penetrated one hundred miles into Florida, they found themselves sur-
rounded, harassed on all sides, and cut off from supplies. By early October, they
were much bloodied and in full retreat. They plundered Spanish settlers as they
went. Amongst their booty was “a large number of slaves, owned by Spanish
masters.”52 In February 1813, another punitive force, comprised of Tennessee
volunteers and U.S. regulars, succeeded in doing far more damage, burning
hundreds of homes, destroying thousands of bushels of corn and stealing live-
stock. By this time, however, the fate of Florida’s peoples was tied to two larger
conflicts: The First Creek War (1813–1814), and the U.S. war against Britain,
(1812–1815).
The British well understood the military opportunities slavery presented.
Forging an alliance with the Seminoles and maroons of Florida comprised a key
part of their operations in the southeast. This strategy rested upon establishing a
fortified settlement at Prospect Bluff, well furnished with cannons, small arms,
and ammunition, at the mouth of the Apalachicola River, just 60 miles from
U.S. territory. When, in the aftermath of the Treaty of Ghent (1814), the British
withdrew, they left the settlement in the hands of the maroons. As recent
historians such as Nat Millett and Matthew Calvin have highlighted, the story
of this fort demonstrates, in principle, the potential for maroon colonies on the
North American continent to thrive, if left in peace. Its population quickly grew
to several hundred men, women, and children. They established a viable
exchange economy and grew their own crops.53 Yet the evident success of this
communitymade it intolerable to the slave society to the north. Southern planters
quickly christened it “the Negro fort,” focusing on its martial character, and chafed
at the danger it supposedly represented. In Georgia, U.S. Brigadier General
Edmund Gaines made repeated communications throughout 1815 to the War
Department, in which he variously, and without any particular justification,
described the people within the fort’s walls as “stolen Negroes,” “outlaws,”
“pirates,” “runaways,” and “murderers,” as he sought to justify a military strike
into Spanish territory.54
Given the failure of previous American military adventurism in Florida,
a degree of wariness on the part of the authorities in Washington was to be
52 Joshua Giddings, The Exiles of Florida (Columbus: Follett, Foster & Co., 1858), 30.
53 Matthew J. Clavin, The Battle of the Negro Fort: The Rise and Fall of a Slave Community
(NewYork: NewYork University Press, 2019); Nathaniel Millet, TheMaroons of Prospect Bluff and
Their Quest for Freedom in the Atlantic World (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2013).
54 Giddings, Exiles of Florida, 37.
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expected. However, the military balance of power in the southeast had now
changed dramatically. Andrew Jackson’s decisive victory over the Creek Red-
sticks (a millenarian religious faction hostile to the United States) in 1814 had
broken the power of one of the most formidable Native American regional
confederacies, securing U.S. military dominance in the region. This conflict
had, inevitably, also been shaped by slavery. The rapacious expansion of an
agrarian economy based upon plantations was one factor that drove the Red-
sticks into war against the United States. Furthermore, they contained within
their faction many African Americans, some runaways, some who had inter-
married, and some themselves enslaved by the Creek (albeit with a high degree
of autonomy and a mutable status). These were both a significant cultural
influence in shaping the Redstick response to the remorseless advance of agrarian
slavery and an important battlefield presence. At FortMims, in August 1813, Siras,
an enslaved man within the stockade, appears to have facilitated the initial Creek
assault.As the fightingworeon, itwasAfricanAmericanwarriors among theCreek
who rallied their wavering line and ensured the fort’s downfall. The violent after-
math of that victory confirmed slavery’s significance in the conflict: the enslaved
members of the defeated garrison were spared; the free, whites, and métis, were
massacred. By July 1814, theRedstick cause had collapsed, but some two thousand
warriors, African Americans among them, fled into Florida rather than surrender.55
They would be pursued even there, as the victorious American commander
then turned his attention southward. The re-enslavement of maroons was clearly
a priority for Jackson, demonstrating how national strategy was bending to serve
the sectional interests of slaveholders. In July 1816 Jackson dispatched a com-
bined naval and land force with the orders, “Blow up the [Negro] fort, and return
the negroes to their rightful owners.” The abolitionist Joshua Giddings would
thus later describe this military venture as the “first slave-catching expedition
undertaken by the Federal Government.”56 The people of Prospect Bluff fought
hard in defense of their freedom. For four days, American forces and their Creek
allies were stalled before the fort’s walls. On the fifth day however, ill-fortune
sealed the defenders’ fate: a “one-in-millions” cannon shot hit the fort’s maga-
zine and detonated their powder, causing a massive explosion that killed almost
the entire garrison of three hundred people.57 Two years later, in March 1818,
Jackson himself led a 3,500-strong force into Florida, which finally ended
Spanish rule. That the conflict was firmly rooted in the racial anxieties that plagued
slave-holding southerners was evident in the justification Jackson offered to a
Spanish officer when he demanded his garrison surrender: “To chastise a
savage foe, who, combined with a lawless band of Negro brigands, have for
55 Joel W. Martin, Sacred Revolt: The Muskogees’ Struggle for a New World (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1991), 72–74, 156–57, 163.
56 Giddings, Exiles of Florida, 39.
57 Millet, Maroons of Prospect Bluff, 234.
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some time past been carrying on a cruel and unprovoked war against the
citizens of the United States, has compelled the president to direct me to march
my army into Florida.”58
In February 1821, a treaty of cession with Spain was finally ratified. This
did not mark the end of the United States’ conflicts with either the Seminoles
or the maroons. Indeed, subsequent pressure from the United States upon the
Seminoles to accept exile to the Indian Territory in the west led to the long and
costly Second Seminole War (1835–1842). Rightly fearing enslavement, the
maroons were the fiercest opponents of removal. Usually fighting in their own
companies, under their own leadership, they played a significant role in ensuring
that the conflict was peculiarly protracted and frustrating for the forty thousand
U.S. regulars and militia that it took to finally subdue a population of some five
thousand Seminoles and maroons. Contemporaries well understood the relation-
ship of the conflict to the question of racial slavery; General Thomas Jesup, upon
assuming command of the United States forces in Florida in 1836, commented
simply that this was “a negro and not an Indian war,” and added the familiar
refrain, “If not speedily put down, the southwill feel the effects of it on their slave
population before the end of the next season.”59
While Florida represented the most striking example, it is worth noting that
similar anxieties were manifested during other expansionist wars that Americans
waged to secure slavery at this time. In December 1835, Sam Houston accused
the Mexican President Antonio Lόpez de Santa Anna of “departing from chi-
valric principles of warfare” by armingAfricanAmericans for service against the
American-led rebellion in Texas. This allegation wasmade against a backdrop of
fears that enslaved Texans were seeking to forge alliances with both Native
American peoples and the Mexican government, whose abolition of slavery in
1829 had done much to spark Houston’s revolt. While larger nations such as the
Cherokee proved largely unresponsive to these overtures, Houston’s fears were
not wholly unfounded even after he secured independence for the slaveholding
Republic of Texas. For example, in March 1839, Texan cavalry clashed with a
mixed band of “runaway Negroes from the eastern Texas plantations, and Biloxi
Indians, commanded by the Mexican General Vicente Cordova.”60
plantation societies and internal warfare
Although it may never have reached the scale or significance that the phenom-
enon did in the Caribbean or South America, and despite the relatively small
58 Quoted in John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 1835–1842 (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 1967), 26.
59 Quoted in Kenneth Wiggins Porter, “Negroes and the Seminole War, 1835–1842,” Journal of
Southern History 30 (1964): 427–50, 427.
60 Kenneth Wiggins Porter, “Negroes and Indians on the Texas Frontier, 1831–1876,” Journal of
Negro History 41 (1956): 285–310, 198–99.
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numbers of individuals involved, such marronage in North America signifi-
cantly shaped first colonial, and later national politics, and is a forceful reminder
of the place of slavery in shaping international relations and as a cause of war.
This is most obvious in the case of Florida. Yet it is perhaps too tempting to
regard the Florida example as wholly exceptional in the history of North
American slavery and its relationship to warfare. Peter Kolchin has described
the “concrete realities” that determined power relations in the slave South: the
large white population, small-scale and dispersed slaveholdings, well-armed
and organized militia and slave patrols, and political stability. Consequent
upon these realities, historians have generally accepted that neithermarronage
nor organized insurrection occurred as anything other than rare episodes,
limited in scale and duration.61 A few, notably Herbert Aptheker, have argued
for a continuous and active revolutionary tradition among North American
slaves. They have shaped the historiography less than those who have under-
stood resistance, and indeed mere strategies for survival, as encompassing a
spectrum of activities, strongly influenced by contingent factors of time, space,
and gender. These include isolated and episodic outbreaks of physical resis-
tance but, far more frequently, instances of temporary absconding (petit mar-
ronage) and permanent flight, passive resistance, and sabotage, through to
behaviors that accommodated or even collaborated with the slaveholding
regime in order to make the ordeal of enslavement bearable.62 Yet by so doing
historians have risked marginalizing the centrality of organized violence to
the maintenance of plantation slavery and plantation society’s essentially
warlike qualities.
In part, this may necessitate a reconsideration of the level and persistence of
physical resistance by the enslaved. Notwithstanding those “concrete realities”
that stacked the odds so decisively against insurgents and maroons, much recent
work has been suggestive of more long-standing and challenging levels of
physical resistance amongst the enslaved than hitherto generally allowed for.
There is now recognition by scholars such as Sylviane A. Diouf that influential
historians like Eugene Genovese deliberately downplayed marronage within
their analysis, partly because of a paucity of documentary evidence and partly
because the scale of such activity was clearly so much greater elsewhere in the
Americas. Nevertheless, by blurring the unhelpful traditional distinctions
between petit and grand marronage, Diouf has uncovered a far more persistent
61 Peter Kolchin, American Slavery, 1619–1877 (London: Penguin, 1995), 155–56.
62 Keyworks on the subject includeHerbert Aptheker,American Negro Slave Revolts (NewYork:
Columbia University Press, 1943); Stephanie M. Camp, Closer to Freedom: Enslaved Women and
Everyday Resistance in the Plantation South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004);
Perry L. Kyles, “Resistance and Collaboration: Political Strategies within the Afro-Carolinian Slave
Community, 1700–1750,” Journal of African American History 93 (2008): 497–508; Gerald W.
Mullin, Flight and Rebellion: Slave Resistance in Eighteenth Century Virginia (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1972).
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and extensive phenomenon, one that needs to be drawn in from themargins of the
historiography of both slavery and American military activity.63 Timothy Lock-
ley’s recent studies of marronage in South Carolina make much the same point.
These trace an active tradition, from the “arm’d, robbing and plundering” of
houses and plantations by a band of “runaways” led by Sebastian, the “Spanish
Negro,” in 1711, through to a “final flourishing” of maroon communities in the
early nineteenth century, evident, for example, in a newspaper report concerning
“serious depredations” on the properties of planters along the Santee River in
1829. Lockley notes that the apparently “episodic” nature of such incidents may
in large part simply reflect the gaps in the available source material, and thus
the true extent and essential continuity of South Carolinian marronage is diffi-
cult to gauge. And, as with Florida, there were contingent circumstances that
especially assisted the maroon in South Carolina: the remote and inaccessible
“back swamps,” the presence of significant numbers of African-born slaves into
the early nineteenth century and the concomitant slow rate of creolization, and
the high proportion of the total population who were enslaved.64
Yet the South Carolinian example cannot be simply dismissed, alongside
Florida, as somehow “exceptional”; Georgia, Alabama, Virginia, North Carolina,
and Louisiana readily offer examples of maroon communities. There are, in
each case, important questions of individual context to consider. For example,
Marcus Nevius’ recent study of the multiple, semi-permanent maroon commu-
nities established in North Carolina and Virginia’s Great Dismal Swamp, from
1763–1856, has demonstrated that they developed informal but beneficial trad-
ing networks with nearby plantations and slave labor camps, fostering, in some
instances, a degree of mutual accommodation.65 Still, the inherent threat posed
by such autonomous communities, even if their only goal was sanctuary, was
generally held intolerable within a slave society. Armed conflict involving
maroons was thus a recurrent event. As late as March 1850, residents of
Cumberland County, North Carolina, requested the appointment of a patrol
committee to secure “the services of young men in the Neighborhood…”
63 Sylviane A. Diouf, Slavery’s Exiles: The Story of the AmericanMaroons (NewYork: NewYork
University Press, 2014).
64 Timothy Lockley, Maroon Communities in South Carolina: A Documentary Record
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2009), 8–9, 127, 128–30. The extent of marronage
should not, however, be taken to indicate any kind of unified opposition to enslavement. Relation-
ships between maroons and those who remained enslaved were complex and often volatile. See
Timothy Lockley andDavidDoddington, “Maroon and SlaveCommunities in South Carolina before
1865,” South Carolina Historical Magazine 113 (2012): 125–45.
65 Marcus Nevius, City of Refuge: Slavery and Petit Marronage in the Great Dismal Swamp
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2020), 66–78. For a provocative anthropological analysis of
the lives of these communities, based upon the archaeological evidence of their material culture, see
Daniel O. Sayers, A Desolate Place for a Defiant People: The Archaeology of Maroons, Indigenous
Americans, and Enslaved Laborers in the Great Dismal Swamp (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida; 2016).
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to move against the “forty or fifty Negro Men” in the area who were committing
“thefts and depredations.” We might conclude that their “depredations” should
be understood as acts of war against the slaveholding regime.66
Such episodes need to be integrated into the mainstream of slavery’s
historiography. The limitations in the sourcematerial, combinedwith a too-hasty
dismissal of Aptheker’s central thesis, have led to an over-emphasis on non-
violent forms of resistance. It has also fostered a tendency to view the “handful”
of planned or actual explosions of violence in the United States, such as the New
Orleans revolt of 1811, Gabriel’s (abortive) Richmond insurrection of 1800, or
Nat Turner’s “fierce rebellion” in Southampton County, Virginia in 1831, as
isolated “local outbreaks,” essentially inconsequential, limited in both scale
and duration, which allow for no meaningful comparison to “massive collective
resistance” elsewhere in the Americas.67 However, understood within the con-
text of an on-going tradition of physical resistance, epitomized particularly by a
tradition of marronage, these episodes were highly consequential. They led to
the forging of a militarized and militant plantation society that existed, from day
to day, in a de facto state of “internal war.”
Thus, it is not merely the actions of the enslaved, constrained as they were
by formidable forces arrayed against them, that demonstrate the full significance
of this internal warfare. It is in the organization and employment of force by
those that held them in chains that reveals once more the centrality of slavery to
“the American way of war.” White southerners had long understood the revo-
lutionary potential inherent in acts of resistance. Following the discovery of
rebellious plots in Virginia in 1709 and 1710, the colony’s governor denounced
those among the enslaved who would “levy Warr against her majesty’s
Government.”68 In November 1802, the citizens of Northampton County, North
Carolina, petitioned for tougher laws to deal with slave conspiracies, to deter the
enslaved from their “constant efforts to effect their freedom by insurrection.”69
The persistent and consuming fear of such servile conspiracies led white society
to employ preemptive organized, collective violence against the enslaved even
in, to use Sara Johnson’s phrase, “the quotidian context” of plantation slavery’s
operation. In response to rumors of a general insurrection on Christmas Eve
1808, in Westmoreland County, Virginia, armed whites stormed into cabins
on various plantations, with orders to “put to death such as resisted.” Joe, an
enslaved man who had slipped out of his own quarters simply to visit his wife on
66 Petition of James Butler, et al., Mar. 1850, Race and Slavery Petitions Project, Series 1, Leg-
islative Petitions (hereafter RSPP), accession #1285004, https://congressional.proquest.com/hist
vault?q=016455-004-0186&accountid=12507 (accessed 5 May 2021).
67 Kolchin, American Slavery, 156.
68 Quoted in Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 120.
69 Petition of the Citizens of the County of Northampton, Nov. 1802, RSPP, accession
#11280209, https://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001542-004-0609&accountid=12507
(accessed 5 May 2021).
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another plantation, was shot and mortally wounded as he attempted to evade the
gunmen.70
As John Hope Franklin observed, this militant Southern society exhibited a
concomitant propensity for violence that contributed to the bitterness of the
secession crisis and the prosecution of the Civil War.71 Yet this was not simply
a socio-cultural characteristic; it determined the nature of the South’s military
and quasi-military institutions. In 1704, fears of servile insurrection and threats
of Spanish invasion led South Carolinians to recognize that “the colony needed
two military forces: a militia to repel foreign enemies, and a patrol to leave
behind as a deterrent against slave revolts.”72 Such slave patrols, in which all
white men were liable for service, were established in all the slave colonies/
states, effectively becoming the front line in the internal war beingwaged against
the enslaved and their allies. In some instances, there was pressure for standing
military forces to be established precisely to secure slavery. At the end of
the century, in December 1797, the military imperative remained. Citizens of
Charleston petitioned for the formation of a permanent garrison of fifty infan-
trymen and twenty-four horsemen, in response to the “dangerous designs and
machinations of certain French West India Negroes.”73
Indeed, in practice, the militia was also frequently mobilized in this
internal struggle, to an extent that historians of America’s military institutions
have not fully recognized. The documentary record is replete with examples of
militiamen deployed against maroons, runaways, and “conspirators,” even in
times of “peace.” In 1795, South Carolinian slave owner John Adams sought
compensation for a “valuable” slave who had been shot and killed “by a Party
of Militia in pursuit of some runaways.”74 In 1802, militia colonel Martin
Byrd requested compensation for expenses incurred during his efforts to sup-
press a “threatened Conspiracy of the Negroes” in Washington County, North
Carolina.75 Similarly in 1805, inWayne County, North Carolina, Isaac Hanley,
a captain of militia cavalry, recorded how his troopers maintained order fol-
lowing the execution of a number of enslaved people and how the “most active”
among them then suppressed “a conspiracy of the slaves.”76 During the
70 Petition of Samuel Templeman, Dec. 1809,RSPP, accession #11680924, https://congressional.
proquest.com/histvault?q=001542-016-0751&accountid=12507 (accessed 5 May 2021).
71 JohnHope Franklin, TheMilitant South, 1800–1861 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).
72 Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2001), 19–20.
73 Petition of Thomas H. McCalla, et al., Dec. 1797, RSPP, accession #11379706, https://
congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001542-008-0457&accountid=12507 (accessed 5May 2021)
74 Petition of John Adams, Dec. 1795, RSPP, accession #11379508. https://congressional.
proquest.com/histvault?q=001542-008-0420&accountid=12507 (accessed 5 May 2021).
75 Petition ofMartin R. Byrd, 1675Dec. 1802,RSPP, accession #11280204, https://congressional.
proquest.com/histvault?q=001542-004-0581&accountid=12507 (accessed 5 May 2021).
76 Petition of Isaac Hanley, Dec. 1805, RSPP, accession #11280502, https://congressional.
proquest.com/histvault?q=001542-005-0074&accountid=12507 (accessed 5 May 2021).
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summer of 1819, the militia was deployed in Williamsburg Parish, South
Carolina to suppress a “rebellion” by maroons “committing depredations of
various kinds.”77 Two years later, in Craven County, North Carolina, “a num-
ber of negroes were collected together in arms … committing thefts, and
alarming the inhabitants.… The outrages of these villains became so frequent
and daring that… it was thought necessary to adopt measures either to arrest or
to disperse them.” The militia was mobilized, only to be fired upon by nervous
slave patrollers in the dark, seriously injuring four of their number.78 That
policing slavery was, de facto, considered a primary function of the militia
is confirmed by an 1830 petition to the North Carolina State Assembly to
reorganize the militia to meet the challenge of an enslaved population that
had become, “Almost Uncontrolable they go and come when and where they
please.”79 The militiamen themselves clearly understood these duties as war
service. In 1825, Colonel John Hill, of the Carteret County North Carolina
militia, sought compensation for his regiment, which had been called out
to “suppress a number of slaves and free persons of color who had collected
with arms and were going about the county aforesaid, committing thefts
and alarming the inhabitants.” Hill maintained that his men should receive
the same pay and rations “as the troops of the United States when in actual
service.”80
conclusion
The persistent use of organized military force exemplified by the militia against
the enslaved serves to confirm the essential nature of North American slavery
as an “internal war.”More broadly, it is just one element in the long and deeply
intertwined relationship between slavery and warfare in North America. This
began in the earliest days of colonization, as Native Americans seized in war
were enslaved in colonial households and plantations or traded within and
between colonies. Slave raiding byNativeAmerican allies to feed this commerce
in captives was a foundation of, in particular, South Carolina’s war making. The
business of slave raiding served both to cement alliances with native confeder-
acies and undermine rival colonial powers, through an indirect strategy of attacks
77 Petition of David Rogers, Nov. 1820, RSPP, accession #11382006, https://congressional.
proquest.com/histvault?q=001542-009-0556&accountid=12507 (accessed 5 May 2021).
78 Petition of John Rhem, Alexander Taylor, Christopher Bexley, and Thomas Ewell, Nov. 1822,
RSPP, accession #11282206, https://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001542-005-0619&
accountid=12507, (accessed 5 May 2021).
79 Petition of P. Cromartie et al., 1830, RSPP, accession #11283004, https://congressional.
proquest.com/histvault?q=001542-006-0294&accountid=12507, (accessed 5 May 2021).
80 Petition of John H. Hill, Dec. 1825, RSPP, accession #11282505, https://congressional.
proquest.com/histvault?q=001542-006-0107&accountid=12507 (accessed 5 May 2021).
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on people under their protection. Yet slavery was a strategic “Achilles’ heel” for
southern colonies themselves. Fear of enslavement turned the military might
of the Yamasee Confederacy against their Carolinian allies in 1715. Spanish
deployment of African American troops and their protection of maroons in
Florida fostered acute racial anxieties that drove a military response from white
southerners. After independence, these anxieties would drag the rest of the union
into successive conflicts in the southeast to secure slavery. The persistence of
maroon activity ensured that those racial anxieties continued to shape the day-to-
day operation of slavery, forging a militant andmilitarized society, andmaking it
difficult to draw meaningful distinctions between “peace” and “war” on planta-
tions. Slavery must, thus, take its place in any consideration of “the American
way of war.”
This conclusion should shape the next stage of debate. Antulio Echevarria II
has recently argued that a significant component of any future study of the
“American way of war” ought to be a comparative study of the United States’
British, German, French, and Russian “counterparts.”81 Yet the formative mil-
itary experiences of the United States were shaped by a powerful nexus of race
slavery and “wars of extirpation” waged against indigenous peoples. Metropol-
itan powers such as Britain and France, it is true, were involved in these
struggles. Yet they did not exert the same long-term influence over their devel-
opment; they were not their “first way of war.” External and internal conflicts
around slavery, and successive wars against Native Americans, link the forma-
tive military experiences of the United States most closely to those of the other
nation-states that emerged from European colonialism in the Americas. It is now
time to make the debate about the “American way of war” both genuinely
American and comparative, by considering the formative U.S. experiences of
conflict in the context of how the other slave-holding regimes of the Americas
waged war.
81 Echevarria II, Reconsidering the American Way of War, 176.
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Abstract: Slavery and warfare were inextricably intertwined in the history of
Britain’s North American colonies and, subsequently, the early republic. Yet this
deep connection has not been acknowledged in the historiography. In particular,
the debate about an “American way of war” has neglected the profound signifi-
cance of slavery as a formative factor in America’s “first way of war.” Here, these
two forms of organized, systemic violence are considered not merely within
a comparative framework but as phenomena whose relationship is so deeply
enmeshed that they cannot be meaningfully understood in isolation. Slavery is
thus placed centrally in an examination of American warmaking, from the colonial
to the antebellum period. Three main areas are highlighted: slave raiding against
Native Americans, slavery as a factor in imperial and national strategy-making and
diplomacy, and slavery as an “internal war.”
Key words: slavery, “American way of war,” marronage, African Americans,
Native Americans, militia, slave resistance
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